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Episodes, events, and models
Sangeet S. Khemlani *, Anthony M. Harrison and J. Gregory Trafton
Naval Research Laboratory, Navy Center for Applied Research in Artificial Intelligence, Washington, DC, USA
We describe a novel computational theory of how individuals segment perceptual
information into representations of events. The theory is inspired by recent findings in
the cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience of event segmentation. In line with
recent theories, it holds that online event segmentation is automatic, and that event
segmentation yields mental simulations of events. But it posits two novel principles
as well: first, discrete episodic markers track perceptual and conceptual changes,
and can be retrieved to construct event models. Second, the process of retrieving
and reconstructing those episodic markers is constrained and prioritized. We describe
a computational implementation of the theory, as well as a robotic extension of the
theory that demonstrates the processes of online event segmentation and event model
construction. The theory is the first unified computational account of event segmentation
and temporal inference. We conclude by demonstrating now neuroimaging data can
constrain and inspire the construction of process-level theories of human reasoning.
Keywords: event segmentation, temporal reasoning, mental models, episodic memory, MDS robot, ACT-R/E
INTRODUCTION
How do people represent and reason about time? Calendars, clocks, and timepieces come coupled
with the convenient illusion of time as a collection of discrete temporal markers, such as months
and minutes, which are experienced in serial order. Events, such as breakfast or the birthday
party, are perceived as hierarchical organized structures relative to those markers. In extraordinary
conditions of sensory deprivation—a prisoner in solitary confinement, for example –the façade of a
regimented temporal hierarchymelts away to reveal the truth: time at the scale of human experience
is a continuous flow of sensory information without subdivision.
Humans organize this unabating stream of sensory input into meaningful representations of
episodes and events. Brain regions are sensitive to perceptually salient event boundaries (Zacks
et al., 2001a), and people learn to segment continuous actions into discrete events in their infancy
(Wynn, 1996). The concept of time, temporal order, and event structure develops throughout
childhood (Piaget, 1927/1969; Harner, 1975; Hudson and Shapiro, 1991). By age 3, children
understand the temporal order of actions and their relations to one another in a sequence of
conceptually related events (Nelson and Gruendel, 1986). Adults in turn rely on complex event
structures in comprehending discourse and temporal expressions (Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976;
Moens and Steedman, 1988), in remembering autobiographical episodes (Anderson and Conway,
1993), and in planning for the future (Bower, 1982). The end result of parsing the continuous
stream of sensory information appears to yield event structures that take the form of a mental
model, i.e., an iconic configuration of events organized around a spatial axis (Johnson-Laird, 1983;
Casasanto et al., 2010; Radvansky and Zacks, 2011; Bonato et al., 2012), from which temporal
relations between can be inferred (Vandierendonck and De Vooght, 1994; Schaeken et al., 1996;
Gentner, 2001).
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There is an intimate link between the processes of temporal
inference and the way in which the brain segments events:
event segmentation yields the mental representations that permit
temporal reasoning. Recent research focuses on how the brain
carves continuous experiences up to build discrete temporal
representations. Behavioral and imaging data suggest that to
construct representations of events online, individuals rapidly
integrate multiple conceptual and perceptual cues—such as a
movement to a new spatial location or the introduction of a
new character or object into the perceiver’s environment (Zacks
et al., 2007). But no theory describes how cues are accessed and
encoded, how they are integrated, and how they are used to build
representations of events; no extant computer program can solve
the task either.
To address the discrepancy, we describe a novel approach
that synthesizes these various operations to yield a unified
theory of event segmentation and temporal inference. We
implemented the system computationally in an embodied
platform that is able to process input from its sensors to
build discrete model-based representations of events. The paper
begins with a review of the functional neuroanatomy of the
brain mechanisms underlying the integration of conceptual and
perceptual cues to mark event boundaries. It then describes a
theory of how processing continuous sensory information yields
episodic memory representations, as well as how those memory
representations are used to build event models. It presents a
computational and robotic implementation of the theory, and
shows how the theory provides a foundation for an account
of temporal inference. Finally, it reviews the present approach
as one that marshals the insights of cognitive neuroscience to
advance theories of high-level inference.
EVENT SEGMENTATION IN THE BRAIN
You walk through a hallway to enter a room, where your
colleague sits behind her desk. You take a seat in front of the desk
and begin to converse with her. You leave the office sometime
later to head to the bar across to street to meet a friend for drinks.
At some point during this sequence of continuous environmental
changes, a new event began: the meeting. At another point, it
ended and a new event began. There exists no direct, observable,
physical cue that marks the beginning, duration, or end of the
meeting: the meeting and its extension across time has to be
perceived indirectly from an integration of multiple internal and
external cues (Zacks and Tversky, 2001), and the process of
perception has to yield a discrete representation of a sequence of
events (Radvansky and Zacks, 2011).
People can systematically parse out meaningful events by
observing sequences of everyday actions (Newtson, 1973;
Newtson et al., 1977). Newtson and his colleagues pioneered
the study of event segmentation behavior, and posited three
hypotheses on the perception of events: first, event boundaries
are distinguished by a large number of distinctive changes in
perceptual stimuli. Second, event boundaries are graded—some
boundaries are sharp and mark distinct separations between
two separate events, whereas other boundaries are fuzzier and
mark less distinguished separations. Finally, events are part of
a “partonomy,” i.e., a part-whole hierarchy (see Cooper and
Shallice, 2006; Hard et al., 2006). For example, suppose you wash
a set of dirty dishes. That event consists of subordinate events
(e.g., wash plate 1, wash plate 2, and so on) and is itself part of
a larger event (e.g., cleaning the kitchen).
Recent neuroimaging studies concur with Newtson’s
proposals. Zacks and his colleagues present decisive evidence
that processes governing event segmentation are unconscious,
automatic, and ongoing (Zacks et al., 2001a, 2010; Speer et al.,
2003). In one study, participants passively viewed sequences of
everyday activities in the scanner, and then viewed the sequences
again while they explicitly segmented the event boundaries
(Zacks et al., 2001a). The data revealed systematic increases
in BOLD response prior to points at which boundaries were
identified; likewise, there was a reliable difference in activation
of frontal and posterior clusters of brain regions as a function of
whether participants marked fine or course boundaries in events.
These two points suggest an ongoing, automatic segmentation
process that integrates cues from external stimuli in the absence
of conscious deliberation. A similar study by Speer et al. (2003)
revealed that evoked responses in the brain’s motion sensitive
area (extrastriate MT+ and the area connecting left inferior
frontal and precentral sulcus) occurred in temporal proximity
to participants’ overt segmentation behavior as they analyzed
videos of action sequences. Schubotz and colleagues show that
MT activation may play a more general role in segmenting
ongoing activity from movements, i.e., not just for goal-directed
action sequences (Schubotz et al., 2012). Participants’ behavioral
data likewise provide evidence for partonomic organization of
event segmentation: their subjective evaluations of coarse event
boundaries overlap with their evaluations of fine boundaries (see
Zacks et al., 2001a). Moreover, when asked to describe events
from memory, participants’ responses reveal a hierarchical
structure such that superordinate events are remembered and
described more frequently (Zacks et al., 2001b).
Online event segmentation is not driven by visual cues alone.
Speer et al. (2009) found an association between activations in
regions of the brain associated with processing event boundaries
and participants’ identification of event boundaries in linguistic
narratives. Event boundaries were distinguished by explicit
changes in characters, locations, goal-directed activities, causal
antecedents, and interactions with objects in the narratives
(Speer et al., 2009). Other evidence reveals brain regions
that subserve online event segmentation in auditory narrative
comprehension (Whitney et al., 2009) and in music (Sridharan
et al., 2007).
These results dovetail with other work that suggests that
understanding action narratives is similar to simulating motor
movements (e.g., Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006). Aziz-Zadeh et al.
show that mirror neuron areas in the premotor cortex are active
both when participants passively observe action sequences as
well as when they read descriptions of those same sequences. As
they argue, the results support the activation of shared mental
representations for conceptually interpreting language input and
for perceptually processing visual input.
In sum, neural evidence corroborates three hypotheses about
event segmentation:
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1. Event segmentation is an ongoing, automatic process.
2. Events are segmented into discrete representations relative
to a temporal partonomy, where events are embedded
within other events. An additional computational
constraint is that because the brain cannot represent
infinite regression, the temporal partonomy must be
bounded.
3. Event segmentation is driven by detecting perceptual
changes in audiovisual stimuli and in conceptual changes in
mental representations of discourse (but cf. Schapiro et al.,
2013).
Gaps in Theories of Event Perception
It may be unimpeachable that people systematically carve
continuous experience into events, and that they do so
by marking boundaries between events. Many views from
philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology even concur that event
structures are discrete in nature (e.g., Casati and Varzi, 2008;
Radvansky and Zacks, 2011; Liverence and Scholl, 2012) and
some theorists posit specific ways in which those structures can
be organized relative to one another (Schapiro et al., 2013).
Indeed, few would argue that representations of event structure
aren’t critical for making inferences about temporal, spatial,
and causal relations. However, consensus over matters of event
cognition does not imply completeness. No extant theory of
event segmentation explains how the process yields discrete event
representations. Instead, many gaps in knowledge exist about
how event structures come about. Three salient questions remain
unanswered by theoretical and empirical investigations: First,
what is the neurocognitive representation of an event boundary?
It may be a discrete representation that is encoded in memory,
or it may be a transient set of activations that are rapidly
extinguished once a representation of an event is constructed.
Second, how does the online process of event segmentation
resolve multiple perceptual and conceptual segmentation cues?
Some cues appear more important than others, e.g., changes in
the focus of an object may be less important than changes in
location, and other cues may compete with one another. Third,
how does the brain recognize an event as an event? In addition
to encoding an event’s spatiotemporal frame, its characters, their
goals, their interactions, and the objects involved, the mind
needs to represent a nested structure of events within other
events, and no theory at present explains what the representation
looks like or what sorts of mental operations are permitted
by it.
To address these three questions, we developed a novel
theory of event segmentation and temporal inference. The
theory builds on the idea that changes to internal and
external stimuli precipitate segmentation behavior, but goes
beyond it to hypothesize that segmentation is driven by the
construction of episodic representations of event boundaries.
Some perceptual and conceptual cues take precedence to others
to yield a precedence hierarchy, and the hierarchy determines the
activations of episodic representations in memory. The episodic
memories in turn allow for the direct construction of mental
models of temporal relations. We present the theory in the next
section.
A UNIFIED THEORY OF EVENT
SEGMENTATION AND REPRESENTATION
Wedeveloped a novel, model-based theory of event segmentation
and event representation. The theory inverts a common strategy
in understanding event segmentation: instead of considering
how individuals parse a continuous stream of information
into discrete temporal units, we begin with the assumption
that the end result of segmentation is the construction of a
temporal mental model (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Schaeken et al.,
1996; Radvansky and Zacks, 2011). Craik (1943) was the first
psychologist to propose that people build and interrogate small-
scale models of the world around them, but philosophers
before him explored analogous notions. Mental models serve
as a general account of how individuals perceive the external
world, how they understand linguistic assertions, how they
represent them, and how they reason from them (see Johnson-
Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991; Johnson-Laird and
Khemlani, 2014). As Johnson-Laird (1983, p. 406) writes, “Mental
models owe their origin to the evolution of perceptual ability in
organisms with nervous systems. Indeed, perception provides us
with our richest model of the world.” Hence, models serve as
a way to unify perceptual and linguistic processes, as they are
hypothesized to be the end result of both. They are pertinent
to reasoning about abstract relations, as well as relations about
time and space (Goodwin and Johnson-Laird, 2005; Ragni and
Knauff, 2013). The model theory depends on three foundational
principles:
1. Mental models represent distinct possibilities: when perceiving
the world and processing language, models represent a
set of discrete possibilities to which the current situation
or description refers. When perceiving the world, models
represent a homomorphism of the sensory input, i.e., many
properties of the sensory input are omitted from the model.
The properties that are represented are subject to the next
principle of the theory.
2. The principle of iconicity: a model’s structure corresponds
to the structure of what it represents (see Peirce, 1931–1958,
Vol. 4). Events are represented as either kinematic models
that unfold in time, i.e., where time is represented by time
itself akin to a mental “movie” (Khemlani et al., 2013)
or else as a spatial arrangement of discrete events, where
time is represented along a mental time line (Schaeken
et al., 1996; Bonato et al., 2012). Logical consequences
emerge from the iconic properties of the models (Goodwin
and Johnson-Laird, 2005) and conceptual simulations on
the models (Trickett and Trafton, 2007; Khemlani et al.,
2013).
3. The principle of parsimony: In scenarios in which discourse
is consistent with multiple alternative models, people
tend to construct a single mental model, which yields
rapid, intuitive inferences. Provided that the inferential
task is not too difficult, they may be able to construct
additional alternative models from a description. However,
inferences that depend on alternative models are more
difficult.
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Mental models account for how people reason about time.
Schaeken et al. (1996) showed that reasoners are faster and make
fewer errors when reasoning about descriptions consistent with
just one event model than descriptions consistent with multiple
models. For example, the following description is consistent with
one model:
John takes a shower before he drinks coffee.
John drinks coffee before he eats breakfast.
The event model consistent with premises can be depicted in the
following diagram:
shower coffee breakfast
The diagram uses linguistic tokens arranged across spatial
axis that represents a mental timeline. The tokens are for
convenience, but the theory postulates that people simulate the
events corresponding to each token. They make inferences by
scanning the iconic representation for relations. When a token
is to the left of a second token on the timeline, the event to which
it refers happens before the event in the second token. Hence,
reasoners have little difficulty deducing that John takes a shower
before eats breakfast from the description. They do so rapidly
and make few mistakes. In contrast, the following description is
consistent with multiple models:
John takes a shower before he drinks coffee.
John drinks coffee before he eats breakfast.
The premises are consistent with the possibility in which the
coffee precedes the breakfast:
shower coffee breakfast
and also with the possibility in which the breakfast precedes the
coffee:
shower breakfast coffee
Reasoners have difficulty in deducing that no relation holds
of necessity between the shower, the coffee, and the breakfast.
They appear to build one model of the assertions and to refrain
from considering alternatives (see also Vandierendonck and De
Vooght, 1994, 1997). Vandierendonck and colleagues further
showed that reasoners construct initial event models relative to
their background beliefs (Dierckx et al., 2004).
The model theory accordingly serves as a viable account
of temporal representation and reasoning, though the theory
does not explain how events are perceived in the first place.
In the following sections, we posit two novel assumptions that
augment previous model-based accounts. The resulting theory
can cope with how people represent durations, and also how
they perceive durational events online. It accordingly provides a
unified account of temporal perception and inference.
Representing Duration with Models
One fundamental challenge to the theory presented above is that
it does not account for how people represent and reason about
events with durations. People make inferences about durations
on a routine basis: if you are scheduled to take part in a meeting
from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m., and a colleague asks you to join him for
lunch at 12 p.m., then you must first detect the conflict and then
prioritize your schedule accordingly. Hence, reasoners base their
actions on understanding durations of events. While previous
incarnations of the model theory have focused on punctate and
not durational events, we extend the theory to deal with both. The
reason is because many events can be construed in a punctual
aspect, i.e., as taking place in a single moment, as well as in a
durational aspect, i.e., one that describes a scenario that endures
across a temporal interval (Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976;
Moens and Steedman, 1988). Consider the following examples
from Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976, p. 429–431):
(a) It exploded when he arrived.
(b) It exploded while he arrived.
In (a), the sentential connective when ensures that the noun
phrase, he arrived, takes on a punctual aspect. Hence, people may
build a model akin to the following:
arrived
exploded
where the two events happen at same time and are therefore
vertically aligned (given a horizontal axis representing time). In
(b), the connective while confers a durational aspect, and so
people may directly represent the duration in their mental model,
e.g.:
[ arrived ]
exploded
where the brackets denote that the arrival is extended across
several time points. As both punctate and durational events are
pervasive in daily life, a rich account of temporal reasoning
must explain how both types of events are represented and
interrogated.
Durational events play an essential role in event perception.
Events are almost always perceived across a temporal interval. If,
as most theories of segmentation posit, people use environmental
changes to mark the beginnings and endings of events, then
events must extend across multiple moments in time for those
changes to be registered. It may be that events are perceived at
first as being durational in nature, and coalesce later into punctate
moments only after being encoded in memory. Exceptions exist:
the moment of birth, the moment of death, and winning the
lottery may be perceived as a single moment in time. But many
events are compiled into punctate representations only under
retrospective analysis. The process of segmenting events assumes
that segmentation is necessary to begin with, and hence, that
most events subject to direct perception have duration.
An initial step to a unified theory of event segmentation
and temporal inference is accordingly to explain how durations
are represented in models. Models concern discrete possibilities;
the theory eschews the representation of infinite sequences,
and so metric information is difficult to represent with models
of possibilities. One challenge is accordingly to describe a
method by which durations are represented discretely. Recent
work in cognitive neuroscience may provide insight into the
nature of the representation. Research on rats reveals specific
hippocampal neurons that fire reliably at particular moments
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in event sequences. These so-called “time cells” encode the
event for later retrieval, as well as episodic information such as
where the event takes place (MacDonald et al., 2011). Studies
on adults corroborate the essential role of the hippocampus
in encoding event sequences, encoding episodic information,
and bridging temporal gaps between discontiguous events
(Kumaran and Maguire, 2006; Lehn et al., 2009; Ross et al.,
2009; Staresina and Davachi, 2009; Hales and Brewer, 2010).
Ezzyat and Davachi (2011) show that event boundaries are
used to bind episodic information to event representations;
more generally, they posit a critical role of episodic memory in
event perception. In a similar vein, Baguley and Payne (2000)
present evidence that people encode episodic traces in memory,
and use those traces to build event models from temporal
descriptions.
We accordingly introduce the following principle about the
representation of durations:
The principle of discrete episodes: Reasoners represent durational
events by constructing discrete episode markers as chunks in
episodic memory. Episode markers represent perceived changes
in goals, locations, individuals, and objects. Markers are retrieved
to construct durational mental models in which one marker
represents the start of an event and another marker represents its
end.
The principle of discrete episodes has implications for both
event segmentation and mental model construction. According
to the principle, when an event boundary is identified during
online event segmentation, an episode marker is constructed.
The event boundary may be triggered by multiple perceptual or
conceptual cues; those cues are encoded in the representation of
the marker (cf. Ezzyat and Davachi, 2011). For example, consider
the scenario introduced in Section Event Segmentation in the
Brain of a meeting with your colleague. The meeting might begin
when you enter your colleague’s office. Many changes occur the
moment you enter: a change in location, the introduction of
a salient individual to the environment (your colleague), the
start of a goal (holding the meeting), and the introduction of a
salient object (e.g., a printout of data). A single episodic marker
encodes all of the detected changes: the location, the individual,
the goal, and the object. When the meeting ends and you leave
the office, there is a change in location, which may precipitate
the construction of another episodic marker. Other things may
or may not change; for example, if your colleague walks with you
back to your office with the printout in hand, no character- or
object-based changes would be encoded.
The principle posits that episodic markers are encoded as
chunks in episodic memory (Altmann and Trafton, 2002, p. 40).
As such, they are highly active when they are first constructed,
but memory for them gradually fades. Markers that encode many
perceptual and conceptual changes start with higher activations
than markers that track fewer changes. Episodic markers are
maintained in long-term memory (cf. Baguley and Payne, 2000),
and when they are retrieved, their activation spikes and spreads to
activate associated markers, i.e., those within the same temporal
context and those that track the same sorts of perceptual and
conceptual changes.
Episodic markers, by definition, encode punctate episodes.
They can also be used retrospectively to construct discrete
representations of events, i.e., durational event models. A
memory of “the meeting” would accordingly consist of two
separate markers as follows:
meetingSTART meetingEND
The markers may encode disparate sets of information. The
start and end of a meeting may be cued by perceptual changes
in location, for example, whereas the start and end of a bike
ride concerns the conceptual introduction and completion of a
goal (We address this issue in a thoroughgoing way in the next
section). In either case, episodic markers can be used to build
event models. Such models can be hierarchically organized:
daySTART dayEND
meetingSTART meetingEND
eveningSTART eveningEND
dinner
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In the model above, each line represents a distinct event. The
model depicts a punctate event (dinner) represented within a
durational event (the evening). The dinner may be conceived
as durational as well, but at the bottom of the hierarchy, non-
intersecting durational events are functionally equivalent to
punctate events. The model is iconic and its components are
discrete, i.e., it does not maintain any metric information by
default, such as how many minutes the “day” event endured or
how many hours the “morning” event endured; hence, people
can reason about events whose durations outlast lifetimes (e.g.,
epochs and eons). Humans and other animals use other neural
mechanisms to track and represent metric information about
duration (see Allman et al., 2014, for a review). The numbers
represent individual episode markers, e.g., 3 represents the
episode marker that encodes the cues used to mark the end of
the meeting. It is also a parsimonious representation from which
to make temporal inferences. For example, the model above can
be used to infer the following temporal relations:
• The dinner did not occur during the meeting.
• The meeting occurred before the evening.
• The dinner happened during the day.
Hence, relations concerning relative duration and other temporal
relations can be drawn from models that maintain only discrete
representations. The principle of discrete episodes posits that
episode markers are used to construct events dynamically and to
retrospectively build representations of events from memory or
linguistic descriptions.
Constructing Models Dynamically from
Episodic Information
According to the principle of discrete episodes, episode
markers encode perceived changes in goals, locations, and other
salient conceptual and perceptual information. But how can
the system use the information encoded within an episode
marker to rapidly construct event models dynamically, even
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as new markers are being encoded? The problem is acute
because the cues used to mark the beginning of an event
may not be relevant in marking the end of an event. The
process of interrogating all of the information encoded by an
episodic marker is cognitively implausible on account of the
combinatorial explosion inherent in assessing and integrating
multiple types of properties. The theory accordingly posits amore
rapid procedure:
The principle of event prioritization: Events are associated with a
single perceptual or conceptual element whose change denotes
the beginning and end of the event. Changes in elements are
prioritized with respect to a given context: by default, goal
events are the highest priority as they override events based on
perceptual changes. When a goal is active, perceptual changes
do not yield episode markers outside the context of the goal.
Perceptual changes are likewise ranked in order of priority based
on the ease of detecting a change: location events override events
based on individuals, which in turn override those based on
objects in the environment.
One way of construing the principle of event prioritization
is that an ongoing event completes only when elements of
the highest pertinent priority change. Recent work uncovers
evidence for the prioritization and ordering of rule sets
(Reverberi et al., 2012), and we extend the general idea to
focus on event perception. In what follows, we describe how
the principle operates for four primary sorts of conceptual
and environmental changes: goals, locations, individuals, and
objects.
Goals
The principle posits that goal-directed events are of utmost
importance. Here we speak of goals in a narrow sense: goals are
mental states that govern immediate, short-term, and ongoing
sequences of actions that bring about a desired state of affairs
in the world. Hence, goal-directed actions are those that
subserve the completion of the goal. Life goals, career goals,
and romantic goals are outside the scope of our present analysis
because they do not govern immediate, short-term sequences.
Many seminal studies on event representations address the
integral involvement of goals in the way events are encoded,
retrieved, and reconstructed (Lichtenstein and Brewer, 1980;
Brewer and Dupree, 1983; Travis, 1997). Goals are of highest
importance because they provide a top-down structure on event
segmentation based on perceptual changes. An example of a
sort of goal that falls within the purview of the principle of
event prioritization is the goal to walk across town to meet a
friend for a drink at a prearranged time. The goal-based event
(walking across town) continues until the goal is completed.
While episodic markers are constructed as the event proceeds,
the perceived event remains organized relative to the goal and
not on any other perceptual experience, such as the perception of
changes in locations or individuals in the environment. Hence,
external cues that would otherwise signal the beginning of a new
event—such as a change in location—would instead signal the
beginning of a new subevent organized within the context of the
goal-based event.
Locations
Locations serve to organize multiple perceptual stimuli. As with
the time cells discussed above, animals and people have dedicated
hippocampal “place cells” that encode location information (see
Moser et al., 2008, for a review). A behavioral demonstration
of their importance is evident in studies by Radvansky and
Copeland (2006) and Radvansky et al. (2010). They show that
memory for objects drops when individuals move through a
doorway from one location to another in a virtual reality
environment, and explain the effect as a dynamic update to
an event model. The principle of event prioritization posits
that locations govern the perception of an event when a high-
level goal stays constant and ongoing, or is absent altogether.
Locations are also more stable than other sorts of perceptual
stimuli because locations generally do not change relative to
another individual’s agency, whereas other sorts of perceptual
cues (the individuals in the environment and the objects they
interact with) do change relative to agency.We discuss them next.
Characters and Objects
Characters and objects in an environment serve as low-level
perceptual cues for the dynamic construction of events in
the absence of both goal- and location-based cues. When
individuals have no goal to govern their actions and their
locations do not change for a long period of time (e.g., when
traveling on an airplane for several hours), the principle of
event prioritization posits that dynamic events are constructed
relative to detecting changes based on interaction, i.e., changes in
individuals and changes in objects to which the perceived attends.
One motivation for the deference of character- and object-based
cues to goal- and location-based cues is that the former two can
change rapidly, and it requires computational resources to track
those changes and use them to update event models. Another
motivation comes from evidence from Zacks et al. (2001b): they
asked participants to describe units of activity as they identified
them in an event segmentation task with instructions to mark
events using a fine-grain or a coarse-grain. Participants described
objects more often using fine-grain descriptions, and they used
a broader variety of words to describe objects for fine-grained
descriptions. These data suggest that people track objects more
frequently when locations and goals do not change. The principle
of event prioritization predicts that they may forget objects as
locations change, in line with the results from Radvansky et al.
(2010).
Summary
The unified theory of event segmentation and event
representation that we posit is based on the assumption
that segmentation yields and reasoning relies on mental models
of temporal relations. Previous model-based accounts could
not explain how durations were represented or how models
were constructed dynamically, and so our unified account
includes two novel assumptions: first, people track changes in
their environment by automatically constructing discrete units
of episodic memory, i.e., episode markers; and second, people
dynamically construct events by prioritizing some cues over
others. A summary of the theory is provided in Figure 1. To test
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FIGURE 1 | A diagram of the unified theory of event segmentation and
representation. In the event segmentation component of the system, which
operates online and in parallel with other cognitive processes, changes are
detected in continuous environmental input across a finite set of perceptual
stimuli, marked by X, Y, and Z in the diagram. At the onset of a stimulus, which
is indicated by a black circle, a new episodic marker is constructed. The offset
of a stimulus likewise yields a new episodic marker. When the system is
queried for information pertaining to temporal relationships, it uses the markers
to build a discrete event model. The system then scans the model to make
inferences.
the viability of the account, we turn next to describe its embodied
computational implementation.
An Embodied Implementation of the
Unified Theory
We developed an embodied, robotic implementation of the
theory described in the previous section. The unorthodox
approach is a result of the multifaceted nature of the tasks
under investigation. The approach may be highly relevant for
roboticists, because many robotic systems lack the ability to
perceive and construct representations of events (Zacks, 2005;
Maniadakis and Trahanias, 2011). But our goal is different. We
argue that an embodied demonstration of the theory at work can
help identify the types of information needed for the algorithms
at each stage of the theory. A viable theory of event segmentation
is one that integrates multiple perceptual and conceptual
cognitive processes such as goal maintenance, location detection,
person identification, and object recognition, and only a working
system that integrates these perceptual processes sufficiently
constrain and inform the implementational details of the theory
we developed. Recent work in our laboratory has focused on
each of these constituent perceptual processes: we have developed
an embodied robotic platform capable of fiducial-based location
tracking (see Kato and Billinghurst, 1999), person identification
through face recognition (Kamgar-Parsi and Lawson, 2011) and
soft biometrics (i.e., clothing, complexion, and height cues;
Martinson et al., 2013) and context-sensitive object detection
(Lawson et al., 2014). The platform’s sensors and perceptual
subsystems are interfaced with ACT-R/E, an embodied cognitive
architecture for human-robot interaction (Trafton et al., 2013)
based on ACT-R, a hybrid symbolic/subsymbolic production-
based system for mental processing (Anderson, 2007). The
system comes with multiple interoperating modules that are
designed to deal with different sorts of inputs and memory
representations called “chunks.” Modules make chunks available
through a capacity-limited buffer. Modules and buffers are
mapped to the functional operation of distinct cortical regions.
ACT-R/E builds on the ACT-R theory in that it can parse
environmental input from perceptual systems, which is translated
into chunks in a long-term memory store (the “E” stands for
“embodied”). ACT-R/E is also interfaced with robotic sensors
and effectors, and so it can act on the physical world. A
summary of the system’s sensors and its cognitive architecture
is provided in Figure 2. We briefly review how the system
implements event segmentation and the construction of event
models.
Online Episodic Segmentation
The principle of discrete episodes posits that at the lowest level,
an agent’s experience is carved up into discrete windows of
time by the encoding of episodic markers. As an agent’s goals,
locations, and observations of objects and people change, new
episodic markers are encoded and annotated with the type of
change (e.g., a change in location) and the contents of the
change (e.g., entered location-b). The markers do not represent
temporal durations, but rather single points in time. Encoding
happens automatically as a natural consequence of attending to
the environment. In the ACT-R/E cognitive architecture (Trafton
et al., 2013) when the computational implementation attends to
a new goal, a representation of that goal is placed within the
system’s goal buffer. The systemmonitors the buffers of relevance
(i.e., the goal buffer for goal changes, the configural buffer for
location changes, and the visual buffer for people and objects;
see Figure 2). It creates a new episodic marker when a change
in content is detected (Altmann and Trafton, 2002; Trafton et al.,
2011). Each episode is symbolically annotated with information
regarding environmental changes. It is also associatively linked to
the prior and new contents, as well as the prior episode marker.
Linking the markers in this way permits subsequent retrievals to
iterate through episodes and their associated contents.
Figure 3 provides a detailed trace of the creation of discrete
episodic markers. At the top of the figure is an activity trace
for an individual patrolling an area. When the goal of patrolling
is assigned (by, e.g., verbally issuing the directive to patrol the
area), a change of goal is detected and an episodic marker (Ep-
1) is encoded, and linked with the encoded goal. As the agent
proceeds through the task, it encounters new locations. For each
change of location, a new episodic marker is encoded (Ep-2,
Ep-3, Ep-4), and populated with details regarding the changes
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FIGURE 2 | The robotic implementation of the ACT-R/E cognitive. (A) depicts the MDS (mobile, dexterous, social) robot in use in our lab, and shows its various
sensors and effectors. (B) provides the details of the ACT-R/E cognitive architecture (Trafton et al., 2013). The architecture is an embodied extension of ACT-R
(Anderson, 2007), and it interfaces the robot’s sensory apparatus. ACT-R/E is composed of multiple modules that mimic components of human cognition. For
example, it includes modules for maintaining goals, storing declarative memories, processing visual, and auditory input, and issuing motor commands. Each module is
paired with a buffer that limits the capacity that the system can process at once, and accordingly implements a processing bottleneck characteristic of human
cognition. Computational implementations of cognitive processes, such as the event segmentation system we present, are developed in ACT-R/E by constructing
procedural memory representations that are executed under pre-specified conditions, and which retrieve information from or else modify the contents of the system’s
various buffers. In the diagram, the thin lines depict the pipeline for retrieval from the contents of the buffers and the thick lines depict the pipeline for modifying the
contents of the buffers.
in location, as well as the prior episodes. At one point, the
agent encounters a new individual (e.g., Bob). It encodes one
episodic marker to capture Bob’s arrival, and another to capture
Bob’s departure. Once the patrolling goal is accomplished, a
new marker is encoded. In line with extant theories of event
segmentation, the process of encoding events is continuous. As
the agent moves on to other tasks, more episodic markers are
created and stored in memory.
To perceive an event as an event, the system must retrieve the
markers in memory and use them to retrospectively construct an
event model. We turn to this procedure.
Event Model Construction
Event segmentation occurs on an ongoing basis by default, i.e.,
episodic markers are encoded online. In contrast, event models
are only constructed retrospectively, as a result of an external
query. It is from these models that people make inferences
about temporal matters. For example, the user can query the
system to remember a particular location, or to infer a particular
relation that holds between events, or to describe the events that
occurred in a given time window. Retrospective construction
is highly relevant when the system needs to make inferences
about its recent experiences. For example, if the system is
directed to perform a particular goal—as in the patrol example
above—then it will have two separate episodic markers that
highlight the start of a new goal and its completion, along
with any associated environmental information that the system
can detect. Now suppose that during the course of the goal,
the system traveled to two separate locations. That means
that the system will construct at least four separate episodic
markers:
1. A marker representing the start of a new goal.
2. A marker representing the detection of a new location
(location 1) as well as the current goal.
3. A marker representing the detection of a new location
(location 2) as well as the current goal.
4. A marker representing the satisfaction of the goal.
These four markers will be represented in long-term memory.
When the system is prompted to recall information about the
particular goal, it can retrieve all four markers. It parses markers
(1) and (2) to build a model of a goal’s duration:
goalSTART goalEND
Information provided from markers (2) and (3) allow for the
construction of the durational event marking location 1:
goalSTART goalEND
location1START location1END
and information provided from markers (3) and (4) allow for the
construction of the durational event marking location 2:
goalSTART goalEND
location1START location1END
location2START location2END
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 8 October 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 590
Khemlani et al. Event segmentation and temporal reasoning
FIGURE 3 | The process by which episodes are encoded at event boundaries. (A) Shows a diagram of a trace of activity as a function of changes in goals,
locations, and people. At each change, a new episodic marker is constructed (depicted as arrows). (B) Shows the representation of each episodic marker. Episodes
are linked with symbolic information that describes the perceived changes at the time of encoding. Hence, episodes are used to uniquely describe a change in goal,
location, person, and object (not depicted).
Hence, a complete event model of the relevant experiences is
represented in the following mental model:
goalSTART goalEND
location1START location1END
location2START location2END
From the model above, individuals can draw deductions
concerning event relations, such as that visiting location 1
occurred during the goal, and the visit to location 1 occurred
before the visit to location 2. The model can be revised and
modified, in which case inferences would be counterfactual
(Byrne, 2005). For example, reasoners can modify the event
model to move the duration of the visit to location 1 after the visit
to location 2. If no other changes are made to the model, then the
reasoner might make the following counterfactual conclusion: if
the visit to location 1 had happened after the visit to location 2,
then it would not have happened while the system was completing
the goal. In sum, episodic chunks can be used to build complex
event models from memories. Scanning and revising the models
accordingly serves as the basis of temporal reasoning.
The basic process for constructing an event model is
illustrated in Figure 4. At the top of the figure is the episodic
representation that was built in the patrolling example above
(Figure 3B). The system constructs an event model by retrieving
the earliest relevant episodic marker (e.g., Ep-1) and checking
how it was triggered (e.g., goal change). From this information, a
provisional event encoding is created and associated with content
regarding the type and trigger for the event (e.g., a goal change
initiated by following a command to patrol a given area). This
information is retained until a compatible episodic marker (e.g.,
Ep-8) is retrieved, marking the end of the event and committing it
to the event model. Each episode is retrieved and processed until
there are no more markers, or some temporal limit is reached.
The process is able to produce veridical event models, such
as that seen in Figure 4B: a veridical event model is a one-to-
one mapping of marker pairs and events. Humans are unlikely to
generate such complex and complete event models, particularly
over long periods of time. Instead event models are influenced
by the goals that triggered the retrospective construction in
the first place. The principle of event prioritization constrains
the construction of episodic marker types. By default, this
prioritization is (from highest to lowest priority): goal, location,
person, and object. During reconstruction, lower prioritized
events are only encoded when they fall within the bounds of
higher prioritized events. In this way, an implicit sub-event
model structure can be reconstructed. Figure 4C shows the
prioritized event model, which only represents the superordinate
event, i.e., the event that characterizes the goal of patrolling
an area. The principle of event prioritization, while specifying
a default prioritization, does not exclude the possibility that
other retrospective tasks could require other prioritizations.
User queries may demand some information over others and
prioritize, e.g., locations to be retrieved. The system supports the
construction of partial, incremental event models.
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FIGURE 4 | The process by episodic markers are retrieved to build event models. (A) Shows the episodic representation (see also Figure 3B). (B) Shows a
veridical event model that can be constructed by an unprioritized mapping from episodic markers to model structures. (C) Shows a prioritized mapping, in which the
construction of a goal event takes precedence to that of other sorts of events. Additional queries can be used to revise and flesh out the prioritized event model.
A demonstration of the system for event segmentation and
model construction as it occurs online is available in theVideo 1.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We describe a unified synthesis of event segmentation and
temporal reasoning. Researchers typically focus on one process
or the other. In our treatment, both are organized around
the construction of discrete temporal mental models (i.e.,
event models). Models serve as the output of the event
segmentation and the basis of temporal inference. Event
segmentation is relevant in the online perception of events.
Humans are capable of applying a regimented hierarchy to
the continuous stream of sensory input they receive, and do
so automatically and without difficulty. Yet no current theory
of event segmentation or computer algorithm explains how
different pieces of environmental input are used to regiment the
stream of input. We accordingly developed an algorithm based
on two overarching principles: (i) individuals represent events
by constructing markers that track perceived changes in goals,
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locations, individuals, and objects; and (ii) episodic markers
are constructed based on a prioritization hierarchy, in which
changes in goals take precedence to changes in location, and
changes in location take precedence to changes in characters and
objects. The theory provides a plausible mechanism for temporal
reasoning. The account thus unifies temporal cognition from
how time is perceived to how temporal relations are inferred. The
two principles upon which the account is based are simulated in
a computational implementation of the theory, and on a robotic
platform that demonstrates the viability of the hypotheses are
guiding online perceptual input.
In addition to advancing temporal cognition, our theory is
grounded in systematic evidence from cognitive neuroscience.
The approach demonstrates a central role for neuroscientific
research in the development of cognitive theory. We conclude
by discussing a recent controversy on the role of cognitive
neuroscience in developing and testing psychological theories of
reasoning.
A central and irreproachable result from recent studies of
the neuroscience of deductive inference may be that it is not
modular: it implicates large swathes of the brain. A given
experiment can show activation in various configurations of
the basal ganglia, cerebellum, and occipital, parietal, temporal,
and frontal lobes (Goel, 2007; Prado et al., 2011). Different
sorts of inference recruit different brain regions (e.g., Waechter
and Goel, 2005; Kroger et al., 2008; Monti et al., 2009), and
a recent meta-analysis of 28 neuroimaging studies revealed
systematic consistency in those regional activations for relational,
quantificational, and sentential inferences (Prado et al., 2011).
Despite evidence of systematicity, many skeptics question if
neuroimaging data can ever help adjudicate between theories
of cognitive operations (Harley, 2004; Coltheart, 2006; Uttal,
2011). The problem is acute for students of reasoning: in order
to make use of the available data, predictions of functional
neuroanatomy are coaxed from psychological proposals. Most
cognitive accounts of inference make no strong claims about
functional neuroanatomy (Heit, 2015), i.e., they make no claims
at the “implementation level” of inference (see Marr, 1982).
Hence, coaxing predictions about implementation from accounts
that specify only the mathematical functions to be computed
for reasoning, or else the representations and algorithms
that underlie reasoning, has the insidious effect of washing
away theoretical nuances (Goel, 2007). Many imaging studies
test the extreme view that the biological implementation of
inferential procedures should rely on only one sort of mental
representation, which has a distinct neural signature. The
preponderance of evidence conflicts with such a view (Prado
et al., 2011), which is fortunate, because the present authors
know of no author or theory that defends it. And as Oaksford
(2015) observes, constraints on the methodology itself may
prevent diagnostic analyses. Researchers accordingly face a
methodological quandary: Is it possible to marshal insights from
cognitive neuroscience to inform theories of reasoning when
those theories fail to make predictions of neural mechanism?
Our present approach demonstrates that it is indeed possible
for theories of inferences to be informed by insights from
cognitive neuroscience. As in previous work on developing an
embodied theory of spatial cognition (Trafton and Harrison,
2011), we describe an embodied theory of temporal cognition
whose fundamental assumptions are informed and constrained
by recent work on the neuroscience of temporal processing.
Cognitive neuroscience may be in its infancy, and likewise,
theories of inference do not make predictions that can be
tested by the imaging methodologies. Nevertheless, results from
imaging studies rule out certain sorts of representations and
provide mechanistic constraints on how humans may engage
in particular cognitive tasks. The preceding discussion serves as
a case study in how neuroimaging results can serve to guide
and constrain the development of theories at Marr’s “algorithmic
level,” which focuses on cognitive representations and processes
upon those representations.
In particular, the representations we proposed in the present
theory—episodic markers and event models—are supported by
work on how event segmentation is carried out by the brain.
Likewise, the procedures we posit, including the hypothesis that
people prioritize certain changes in the environment over others,
are guided by both behavioral and imaging work on mental
processes that track ongoing changes in the environment. Hence,
cognitive neuroscience can play a pivotal role in the development
and enrichment of cognitive theories of reasoning: imaging
research can serve to rule out representations that cannot be
feasibly processed by complementary neural processes, and it can
suggest the need for alternative representations.
The skeptics may ultimately have purchase: no psychological
theory of reasoning can be said to be testable by means of
neuroscientific data unless that theory makes specific predictions
of neural processes. A first step toward such a theory for
any domain of cognition is to provide a unified account of
that domain that explains how low-level perception leads to
high-level inference. In the case of temporal cognition, we
provide such an account, and explain how events are perceived
to build mental simulations of their temporal experience,
and how reasoners make temporal inferences from those
simulations.
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